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This book provides brief histories of the nuclear strategies of NATO as a whole, and of Britain and France, as well as the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany), from the beginning of the Cold War. These are explained in relation to the perceived Soviet threat, and European perceptions of the reliability of the American 'nuclear guarantee'. Parallel and comparative analyses of these strategies show that once America was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear reprisals, American strategic preferences differed fundamentally from those of the Europeans, and that Britain and France mainly for this reason felt the need for nuclear forces of their own. This option was unavailable to the FRG, although it long pursued, together with the French and the Italians, the project of an independent European nuclear force. The convergence of European strategic needs is demonstrated, which accounts for other projects for and forms of European nuclear cooperation.