Perils of Bipolarity

Intrastate conflicts, ranging from localized rebellions to civil war, increased linearly from 1946 through 1992 and then dramatically decreased in the post-Cold War era. This rise and fall of subnational conflict closely mirrors the "proxy" wars fought by or between the USSR and the US; the term refers to "(g)reat power hostility expressed through client states" and describes superpower use of these states to pursue strategic and ideological goals within the confines of nuclear deterrent postures extant during the Cold War. This was done in large part to achieve strategic national interests and other political goals without risking nuclear war. In its waning years the USSR could no longer afford to fund these wars; America ended support to many of these commitments soon after. With resources dried up, former client states and subgroups had little choice but to resolve these conflicts, either via negotiation or decisive victory.... This paper is arranged as follows: Section Two defines subnational and proxy conflicts and explains why nuclear powers in a bipolar system make strategic policy choices to compete by proxy over contentious issues. It reviews the historical record of subnational proxy conflict conducted by both by the US and USSR from 1946 through the end of the Cold War era. The next section discusses the rationale for my claim that China will soon be poised to challenge the US within a new bipolar order, with a concomitant increase of proxy conflicts between the two. Section Four reviews the implications for US grand and military strategies, as well as for defense acquisition programs and development of future doctrine to meet this new order.