When do Managers act in terms of the owners?

Managers are supposed to secure the existence of the company and to maximize the profits or shareholder value respectively. However, one of the greatest controversies at present, the subprime crisis, is an example for managers abusing their power. Therefore, the question which arises in this context is, when do managers act in terms of the owners. To do so, managers have to behave economically rational in terms of the owners, that is, the manager has to choose the best option from a purely monetary and sustainable perspective. This includes decisions which may decrease managers' social reputation and induce them to act in terms of the owners. In this context this thesis aims to analyse under which conditions managers really act in terms of the owners. Principal-Agent-Theory and the economic and social model of human behaviour as described by Zintl (1986) are combined to analyse managers' behaviour in different legal structures of the company and different social and financial conditions of the managers. The behaviour of managers' who are solely executives as well as of shareholders who are executives at the same time will be determined.